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to the action."38 In conclusion, he observes that "The privacy of the
individual, history assures us, can never be protected where its
violation by state officers meets with reward rather than punishment."3 9
Allen L. Graves, '62

LABOR LAWFEDERAL COURT INJUNCTION
AGAINST BREACH OF NO-STRIKE CLAUSE
A union picketed interstate motor carriers to induce non-union
clerical employees to join the union, and caused a shutdown of employers' terminals. The employers sought an injunction to specifically enforce the no-strike clause of the collective bargaining agreement in a federal court under Section 301 (a) of the Labor Management Relations Act which states: '
"Suits for violation of contracts between an employer and a labor

organization representing employees in an industry affecting com-

merce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States

having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount
incontroversy or without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
Held: Federal courts have jurisdiction to issue injunctive relief
to enforce the no-strike clause in spite of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act
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Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650, 652 (1961).
Pugach v. Dollinger, 81 Sup. Ct. 650, 653 (1961).

161 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1958).
2 The relevant sections under the Norris-LaGuardia Act are the following:
1. Section 4: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction to

issue any restraining order or temporary or permanent injunction in any
case involving or growing out of any labor dispute ... " 47 Stat. 70
(1932), 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1958).
2. Section 7: "No court of the United States shall have jurisdiction
to issue a temporary or permanent injunction in any case involving or
growing out of a labor dispute, except after hearing the testimony of witnesses in open court (with opportunity for cross examination) in support
of the allegations of a complaint made under oath, and testimony in opposition thereto, if offered, and except after finding of fact by the
court.... ." 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 107 (1958).

3. Section 13 (c): "The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy
concerning terms or conditions of employment, or concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,

NOTES
3

dispute.

The main purpose of the Norris-LaGuardia Act was to remedy
what Congress regarded as the unjust practice of freely enjoining
strike activity by which some Federal courts deprived labor of its
most powerful weapon in disputes with management. 4 After the
Act was passed, management was forced to bargain collectively with
labor instead of having union organizational activities enjoined on
one of the various possible grounds previously available. The
main issue of the principal case, therefore, was whether Section
301 (a) repealed by implication the Norris-LaGuardia Act's specific
prohibitions against the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute.
The judiciary generally does not favor the repeal of an important piece of legislation by implication.5 When Congress enacted

changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether or not the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and employee." 47 Stat. 71 (1932), 29 U.S.C. § 113(c) (1958).
3Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345 (10th Cir.
1960) cert. granted, 81 S.Ct. 378 (1961).
Contra, A. H. Bull Steamship Co. v. Seafarer's Union, 250 F.2d 326
(2nd Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U. S. 932 (1958), Baltimore Contractors
v. Carpenters, 188 F. Supp. 382 (E.D. La. 1960).
There are a number of collateral cases which refused to issue an injunction under Section 301 (a). The district court in Local 861, IBEW
(AFL-CIO) v. Stone & Weber Engineering Corp., 163 F. Supp. 894 (W.D.
La. 1958), refused to issue an injunction when the union alleged the company stopped work in violation of its contract with the union. The reason
being that the Norris-LaGuardia Act precluded the issuance of an injunction in a labor dispute.
In Sperry Gyroscope Co. v. Hall, 185 F. Supp. 65 (S.D. N.Y. 1960),
the district court refused to issue an injunction enjoining the president
of the Engineer's Union from affiliating with an international union
without first obtaining the approval of the majority of those in the bargaining unit, as required by the collective bargaining agreement, since
this was a labor dispute under the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
In Local 33, International Hod Carriers, Building and Common
Labors' Union v. Mason Tenders District Council, 186 F. Supp. 737 (S.D.
N.Y. 1960) and International Union of Doll & Toy Workers v. Metal
Polishers, 180 F. Supp. 280 (S.D. Cal. 1960), the respective district courts
refused to grant an injunction due to the violation of a no-raiding agreement between two unions. But, in United Textile Workers v. Textile
Worker's Union, 258 F.2d 743 (7th Cir. 1958) and Local 2608, Lumber
and Sawmill Workers v. Millmen's Local 1495, 169 F. Supp. 765 (N.D.
Cal. 1958), the respective courts reached opposite results on similar facts.
4S. Rep. 163, 72nd Cong., 1st Sess., 11, 25 (1932); FRANKFURTER and
GREEN, THE LABOR INJUNCTION, 52, 81, 200, 205 (1930).
5For a discussion of the implied repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act by
Section 301(a) of the Taft-Hartley Act, see Judge Magruder's opinion
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the Taft-Hartley Act, it was not unmindful of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act. Congress took special care to make the Norris-LaGuardia
restrictions inapplicable in two specific cases: national emergency
strikes where the suit is brought by the Attorney General, 6 and
unfair-labor-practice cases where injunctive relief in a district
court is sought by the National Labor Relations Board.7 The main
purpose of Section 301 (a) was to make collective bargaining agreements equally binding on employers and unions, by removing the
main obstacles to suits by and against unions: i.e. the procedural
difficulties arising from suits involving an unincorporated association,8 and the limitation of federal jurisdiction in terms of diversity
and jurisdictional amount.9
Thereafter, a question arose as to whether the statute should
be construed as merely jurisdictional or as also establishing a
federal substantive law for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements. 10 This question was resolved in Textile Workers Union
v. Lincoln Mills," which held a federal substantive law had been
created. In that case, the Supreme Court held that Section 301 (a)
requires federal courts to give specific enforcement to agreements
to arbitrate grievance disputes. In reaching this conclusion, the
Court relied heavily upon the legislative history of Section 301 (a).
This history, although characterized by the Court as being "cloudy

in W.L. Mead, Inc. v. Interantional Bhd. of Teamsters, 217 F.2d 6 (1st
Cir. 1954), holding that federal courts are without jurisdiction to issue
temporary injunctions in order to enforce collective bargaining agreements which contain no-strike clauses. Compare, U. S. v. Hutcheson,
312 U.S. 219 (1940), which conveys the impression that the Norris-

LaGuardia Act must be read in conjunction with all other labor legislation; thus Section 301(a) could repeal Norris-LaGuardia by implication.
661 Stat. 155 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 178(a) (1958).
761 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(h) (1958).
8S. Rep. No. 105, (Part 1), 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 15-18 (1947); H.R. Rep.

No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 65-66 (1947); statements by Senator Taft,
93 Cong. Rec. 3839, 4262 (1947).

9H.R. Rep. No. 245, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., 6, 46 (1947).
1OAssociation of Westinghouse Salaried Employees v. Westinghouse Electric Corp., 348 U.S. 437 (1954).

For leading articles discussing this case, see, Cox,
Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. REV. 1482 (1959);
Gregory, The Law of the Collective Agreement, 57 MICH. L. REV. 635
(1959); Bickel and Wellington, Legislative Purpose and the Judicial
Process: The Lincoln Mills Case, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1957); Feinnsinger,
Enforcement of Labor Agreements-A New Era in Collective Bargaining, 43 VA. L. REV. 1261 (1957); and Bunn, Lincoln Mills and the Jurisdiction to Enforce Collective Bargaining Agreements, 43 VA. L. REV.
1247 (1957).

11 353 U.S. 448 (1957).

NOTES
and confusing,' '1 2 was read as reflecting a federal policy of promoting the inclusion of no-strike clauses in collective bargaining agreements and providing for the enforcement of arbitration clauses
given in return for the no-strike agreements. 13 Or, as the Court
worded its reasoning, the agreement to arbitrate grievance disputes
is the quid pro quo for an agreement not to strike. 14 The principal
case relied upon this reasoning in reaching its own conclusions; an
inference to be drawn from the enforcement of arbitration clauses
given in return for no-strike clauses. 15
The Court in the Lincoln Mills case was faced with the difficult
question of deciding what substantive law was to be applied to
breach of contracts under Section 301 (a), after deciding that Section 301 (a) was more than jurisdictional. The Court solved this
question by stating, "We conclude that the substantive law to apply
in suits under Section 301 (a) is federal law, which the courts must
fashion from the policy of our national labor laws .... The range
of judicial inventiveness will be determined by the nature of the
Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 452 (1957).
13 Mr. Justice Frankfurter dissented in a rather unusual 86 page opinion,
including the entire relevant legislative history of Section 301(a), in an
attempt to show that Section 301 (a) created procedural rights rather
than substantive rights. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353
U.S. 448, 460 (1957).
14 Textile Union Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 455 (1957). Heavy
reliance is placed upon the quid pro quo statement mentioned in the
Lincoln Mills case, which is repeated in subsequent decisions concerning
Steelworkers
the enforcement of collective bargaining agreements:
Union v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 564 (1960); Steelworkers Union v. Warrior & Gulf Co., 363 U.S. 574, 578 (1960). The
meaning of the quid pro quo doctrine is not too clear, but seems to
infer that the arbitration clause is the quid pro quo given by the employer
in return for the no-strike clause agreed to by the union. From this
it is argued that the latter provision is also specifically enforceable.
It appears from the American Manufacturing Co. case that several
members of the United States Supreme Court have disassociated themselves from the quid pro quo doctrine. See, 363 U.S. 564 (1960) (Mr.
Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Frankfurter and Harlan, concurring).
15 Teamsters Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345, 349 (10th
Cir. 1960), cert. granted, 81 S. Ct. 378 (1961). "It is true that Lincoln
Mills was concerned only with the agreement to arbitrate in a labor
contract, and it is also true that the injunctive enforcement of such
agreements was not one of the abuses against which Norris-LaGuardia
was aimed. But even so, it seems plain enough that the court in Lincoln
Mills did not intend to confine Section 301 jurisdiction to the specific
performance of arbitration clauses in labor contracts. Rather, we think
the court had in mind a much broader concept of jurisdictional authority
-one which embraced all violations of labor contracts which had been
freely arrived at through the collective bargaining process."
12
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problem."1 6 The Court in the principal case also relied upon these
expressions of what law is to apply in suits under Section 301 (a),
and felt that the policy and purpose of our national labor laws
warranted the enforcement of a no-strike agreement embodied in
the collective bargaining agreement. 17 If the quid pro quo doctrine, originated in the Lincoln Mills case, is literally applied, a court
might specifically enforce an arbitration clause and enjoin a strike
as upsetting or interfering with the mandate of the court to
arbitrate.' s
In a number of suits under the Railway Labor Act, 19 the federal
courts have held that the Norris-LaGuardia statute does not apply
to an injunction against a strike over a contract dispute which is
required to be submitted to the National Railroad Adjustment
Board.2 0 This was done under the premise that the Railway Labor
Act offers specific machinery for the handling of such disputes. It
is quite conceivable that a court could follow this same rationale
in reviewing a collective bargaining agreement entered into under
the National Labor Relations Law, and setting up specific arbitration machinery for the settlement of strikes.
But there is a distinction between the enforcement of an
arbitration clause and the enforcement of a no-strike clause. When
the Court in Lincoln Mills held that arbitration was enforceable
because it was not one of the abuses covered under the anti-injunction facet of the Norris-LaGuardia Act, it was, in effect, holding
Norris-LaGuardia inapplicable because of the absence of a "labor
dispute." In this situation, the only federal law that was being
carried out and fashioned from our national labor laws was the
Taft-Hartley Act itself. But when the problem of a no-strike clause
is considered, then certainly the Norris-LaGuardia Act cannot be dismissed so easily. While Congress may not have legislated in NorrisLaGuardia as to arbitration, it does seem that it specifically legislated with respect to strikes in that Act. It could be argued that
16 Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 456, 457 (1957).
17 "While this controversy may come within the literal reading of NorrisLaGuardia, we think the jurisdictional limitations there must be read
in the light of the language and underlying of Section 301.. . ." Teamsters
Union v. Yellow Transit Freight Lines, 282 F.2d 345, 350 (1960), cert.
granted, 81 S. Ct. 378 (1961).

18

See, e.g., Johnson & Johnson v. United Textile Workers, 184 F. Supp. 359
(D. N.J. 1960).

19 Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Chicago R. & Ind. R.R., 353 U.S. 30
(1957); Long Island R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 185 F. Supp.
356 (E.D. N.Y. 1960); and Denver & R. G. W. R.R. v. Brotherhood of R.R.
Trainmen, 185 F. Supp. 369 (D. Colo. 1960).
2048

Stat. 1189 (1926), 45 U.S.C. § 153 (1958).

NOTES
since the Norris-LaGuardia Act has been of such prime importance
in formulating our national labor law, its procedural facet is not
all that should be considered, but that it has acquired a substantive
facet too. 21 If this is true, then according to Lincoln Mills, the courts
should take this into consideration with respect to a no-strike provision in a collective bargaining agreement.
In the final analysis, the principal case may be correct in that
it will effectuate more positively the policy of our national labor
laws. Both the Norris-LaGuardia Act and the National Labor
Relations Act have as their general objectives the settling of disputes within the bargaining process. The labor movement has
become sophisticated to such an extent today that stability would
result if collective bargaining agreements were specifically enforced. 22 The Norris-LaGuardia Act was passed at a time when
there was great instability in the labor movement. The unions were
fighting for recognition and the right to bargain collectively with
management. These goals having been achieved, it seems only correct that both labor and management should be able to rely23upon
their contracts and be bound by their freely made agreements.
G. Bradford Cook, '62.
21
22

See, U.S. v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219 (1940).
"Statutory recognition of the collective agreement as a valid, binding,
and enforceable contract is a logical and necessary step. It will promote a higher degree of responsibility upon the parties to such agreements, and will thereby promote industrial peace." S. Rep. 105, (Part I),

80th Cong., 1st Sess., 18 (1947).
23 The policy argument broadly stated is, "[E]ven if it [lifting the Norris-

LaGuardia ban on strike injunctions in arbitration cases] be viewed as
a return to the era of labor injunctions, this anathema of a generation
past must be viewed from a present day perspective. Labor organization has now reached a state of development where it should be bound
by its contractual obligations as is any ordinary individual. If in return
for collective benefits the union agrees not to strike, it should be held
to both the benefits and the burdens of the contract. If the parties agree
to arbitrate, the agreement should be enforceable-and effectivelyregardless upon whom the onus may fall ....
The zealous protection and
humanitarian immunization formerly accorded to organized labor were
necessary and desireable in a period when labor-management equality
was not a reality but an ever sought after goal. If the goal has been
achieved and a contract has been freely and voluntarily made, the pro-

tection and immunization become anachronisms-unsuitable for current
conditions and indeed a hinderance to the development of responsible
unionism." Mendelsohn, Enforceability of ArbitrationAgreements Under
Taft-Hartley Section 301, 66 YALE L. J. 167, 183 (1956). On the general

proposition of specifically enforcing no-strike agreements, see, Garbus,
Equitable Remedies and the Collective Bargaining Agreement, 15 N.Y.U.
INTRA. L. REV. 105 (1960).

